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Foreword 
The optimal organization of research and development (R&D) in a market economy is one of the unsettled 
questions of economics. R&D has great externalities that make its support more complicated than most goods 
in  which the contrasting of private benefits with private costs in a market system approximates the social 
welfare. Thus, the organization of R&D becomes a key issue in a transition to a market system of a former 
centrally planned economy. This is particularly so for the USSR1, which has been a major source of science and 
technology. 
Recognizing its importance, Deputy Prime Minister Laverov approached the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) to initiate collaborative work with the USSR State Committee for Science and 
Technology and the USSR Academy of Sciences on the topic of Research and Development Management in 
the Transition to  a Market Economy in  the autumn of 1990. Dr. Peter de Jilnosi, Director of IIASA, and 
Professor Merton J. Peck, Leader of the Economic Reform and Integration (ERI) Project (also IIASA), met the 
Deputy h i m e  Minister to discuss such a cooperation. 
The collaboration began with a meeting in November 1990 organized by IIASA with the support of the 
Committee for Systems Analysis of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This meeting explored the feasibility of 
creating an IIASA research activity on the impact of economic reform and transition upon the organization and 
management of science and technology in the USSR. An agreement was reached that IIASA would participate 
in  an activity with the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology concerning R&D Management in the 
Transition to a Market Ecorwmy. This activity would be led by Professor Richard Levin from Yale University 
and Dr. Sergei Glaziev from the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute in Moscow. 
The second conference held on this topic, cosponsored by the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology 
and IIASA, and organized with the International Center for Research into Economic Transformations (Moscow), 
was an  outgrowth of discussions with representatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the State Committee, 
and the Center in January 1991. IIASA was invited to arrange a meeting in which the numerous issues 
involved in the restl-ucturing and organization of scientific and technological activities in  the Soviet Union could 
be discussed in systematic ways. Soviet experts prepared papers dealing with the Soviet Union's present 
situation and reform plans regarding R&D management. These papers were presented at the Conference and 
commented on by a small group of economists, engineers, and R&D managers from the United States, Europe, 
and Japan. 
The Conference, held in Moscow in July 1991, provided an exceptional opportunity to review and discuss science 
policy in a economy maldng the difficult transition to a market system. The new data and ideas for changes in 
the Soviet science and technology sector were of great interest to experts from West and East. The discussions 
resulted in a commitment to longer term research on an extended list of topics. More about the future plans 
can be read in the corresponding section of this paper. 
The author of this s w m a r y  of the Moscow Conference is indebted to all participants, particularly those who 
took the extra time to read and comment on drafts of this paper. However, this review represents the author's 
interpretations and any omissions or inconsistencies are his own. 
Chrisfoph M. Schneider 
Economic Transition and 
Integration Project 
IIASA 
1 The names USSR or Soviet Union used in  this paper refer to the area previous to August 1991, which is 
now termed as the former Soviet Republics. 
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Introduction 
The development of an appropriate science and technology policy is one important aspect 
of the Soviet movement away from a centrally planned system to a market economy. 
R&D policy will impact on other economic, political and social changes and, in turn, will 
be altered by all the changes made elsewhere. 
Experts from the Soviet Union believe that science and technology management in the 
USSR must become responsive to demand, flexible and, in one way or another, profit 
oriented. In the past and largely still today, Soviet R&D has been a part of the large non- 
market sector. Present government plans and actions provide for the creation of a market 
for research and technology. Great urgency is attached to such a goal. The fact that each 
market economy is unique to a certain extent provides a number of alternative approaches 
for the integration of R&D into a market economic system. Soviet policy-makers and 
scientists are looking toward western industrialized market economies to gain an 
understanding of how to deal with research and development in a market environment 
and, still more fundamentally, how to prepare the science and technology community of 
a command-type administrative economy to respond to a market system. 
The present situation in the USSR with respect to science and technology policy is both 
revealing and interesting. Soviet science is regarded as a unique cultural system. Due 
to the crumbling and disappearance of the economic and political system that maintained 
it, the scientific community in the USSR is left largely to fend for itself. The goals of 
Soviet policy-makers and scientists lie in promoting the transition to a market economy, 
while preventing the collapse of one of the world's largest R&D communities. The current 
disproportions arising in the still mainly administratively dominated system underline the 
urgent need to reorganize the science and technology sector and the policies that regulate 
it. The growing imbalances are the result of: 
concentration of resources in  obsolete industries, 
the availability and distribution of financial resources for R&D, 
a large technology gap between military and civilian sectors, 
the relatively low share of the private commercial sector in economic activity, 
distorted and conflicting incentive structures (i.e., for enterprises, branch ministries, etc.) 
high level of vertical integration in industry, lack of inter-industry supply relationships or 
other cooperation, and loose economic ties between real technological demand and performed 
R&D, 
absence of adequate intellectual property rights, 
monopolization, barriers to entry, and a lack of participation in the international market with 
outputs and inputs (i.e., technology), 
9. interbranch andinterorganizational barriers between research institutes and staff in industry, 
higher education, and the Academy of Sciences, and 
10. an inappropriate tax system, collapse of the state budget and state promotion of R&D. 
This is not an exhaustive list of the issues, but i t  does give some indication of the 
immense reconstruction required to promote the sustainability of market-oriented 
technology development and science policy. Many Soviet experts agree that a new, much 
more flexible, techno-institutional market structure is essential. This structure must 
introduce aspects of competition, stimulate the supply of innovations and their diffusion 
while simultaneously allowing demand stimuli from the economy to influence the 
innovators and researchers, allow a blending of domestic and global R&D priorities, and 
facilitate a longer term perspective for R&D investors. Unfortunately, the threats of mass 
unemployment in the scientific community and other sectors, increases in emigration of 
domestic experts, the uncertain path of conversion of the defense industry for civilian 
purposes, the regression of the once all-round, high international scientific standing, the 
deterioration of the precise potential upon which a modern growth economy depends, and 
the waste of intellectual resources paint a gloomy picture for future Soviet economic 
development if something suitable is not soon done about the science and technology 
sector. 
Soviet policy-makers and scientists are particularly concerned about these issues due to 
their relevance to the future potential of the whole economy and the success of the general 
reform effort. The transition to the market brings with it many prospects, but also 
problems. A delicate balance of policies must be found in order to, a t  least to some extent, 
secure the currently available R&D resources to provide a basis for economic growth as 
well as productivity and efficiency increases, while simultaneously subjecting them to 
market forces. Thus, the key questions that must be dealt with are: how the present R&D 
community can be integrated or transformed to be an integral part of the new techno- 
institutional market structure and how this will proceed during the economic transition 
of the Soviet Union? 
Numerous experts, from both East and West, indicate that the answer lies in the 
appropriate management of research and development in the USSR. And this was 
precisely the topic which was the central theme of the conference summarized in this 
paper. 
The Conference (consequently also this paper) focussed on five topics. These were: 
1. R&D in the Soviet Economy 
2. Case Studies of Soviet R&D 
3. Technological Change in the Soviet Union 
4. Prospects for Restructuring the Institutions of Technological Change 
5. Plans for Further Research 
As the Conference program in the Appendix indicates, each session encompassed 
presentations by Soviet experts based on previously prepared papers and corresponding 
remarks to these papers by Western discussants. What follows is a short description of 
key points elaborated in the presentations and a summary of the discussions on each 
topic. The meeting provided a frank and open exchange of ideas and the opportunity to 
see data previously unavailable to researchers in the West. Further information on this 
topic and this activity can be obtained from the Economic Transition and Integration (ETI) 
Project a t  IIASA. 
R&D in the Soviet Economy 
The Presentations? 
There is a goldmine of information in the three papers prepared for this session of the 
Conference. Western experts could only be impressed by the openness and generosity of 
information that was made available. Much of i t  had not yet fallen under the scrutiny of 
Western observers and was often not all too familiar amongst the Soviet colleagues 
themselves. The papers offer an insider's view of the origin and present situation of 
science and technology in the USSR. On the one hand, the authors are not reserved in 
their criticisms of the past management of research and development, while, on the other, 
they consistently emphasize the available potential and ability that can ensure the 
survival of the science and technology sector throughout the rough time of transition to 
an economy dominated by market forces. The paper by Gokhberg and Mindely, Soviet 
R&D Resources: Basic Characteristics, enables Western researchers to constmct a clearer 
picture of Soviet R&D based on up-to-date and reasonably comparable data. In order to 
set the stage for the summary of the discussion, let us now turn to a short review of a 
number of the essential points presented. 
2~e fer  to the conference program in the Appendix to find details about the titles of the papers presented 
and their respective authors. 
The origin of the present structure of science and technology policy is the same as that 
of the State which it serves. Political goals, which had priority in such a system, caused 
the evolution of science to be frequently determined by factors of national prestige rather 
than the true needs of economy and society at  large. The result has been the rise of a 
socio-economic phenomenon called "branchdom": division of the economy into separate, 
rather isolated, sectors. By the end of the 1930s when the centrally planned system (CPS) 
was in full swing, all production decisions including R&D and long term development 
issues were taken from the authority of industrial enterprises and transferred to higher 
management levels (i.e., Ministries and State Committees). 
. . ., ., 
This practice made it difficult for the consumers of R&D products to influence the field, 
effort, and funding of research through channels typical of a market economy. The 
scientific community was forever attempting to utilize its bargaining power to influence 
these elements, though with distorted results. Thus, branchdom cultivated scientific 
monopolies that distorted the goals of technological progress. This led to a structure in 
which mainly large-scale R&D institutions, often with many thousands of employees, were 
most viable. A limited number of rather small-scale institutes, directly serving some 
ministerial directives, also functioned. In the period between 1975 and 1985, while the 
government imposed strict restrictions on the process of establishing new R&D 
institutions in fear of losing control, the average size of a R&D institute grew by more 
than 25 %. Furthermore, the CPS has been the prime culprit in creating strong inter- 
branch and inter-organization barriers that prevent information exchange between 
scientists in research institutes and staff in industry, higher education, and the Academy 
of Sciences. 
Basic and applied research are separated from one another by organizational autarky of 
Industrial Ministries and the Academies of Science. R&D plans for different departments 
of the CPS were determined by corresponding bodies in the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party, the State Planning Committee, the Military-Industrial Commission, 
and the State Committee on Science and Technology. Other than in military-industrial 
R&D, inadequate coordination led to mismanagement and conflicting indicators and 
objectives. There was a continual conflict between enterprises' and branch ministries' 
planning perspectives and the actual duration of technological development from research 
and development through to implementation and diffusion. Additional barriers between 
the Academy, educational institutions, and industry (as well as between industries) split 
the scientific community into different groups with weak communication and under strict 
regulation. Therefore, the early 1980s saw the structure of the Soviet R&D sector as 
extremely monopolized (with discretionary distribution of R&D resources depending on 
quality) and exceptionally inflexible and unable to respond to new demands of society and 
science itself. 
Despite periodic showings of scientific achievement, the 80s were a time of decline for 
Soviet R&D: stagnation and an ever-widening gap between the rate of intellectual 
production to that in the industrialized countries had become the distinguishing 
features3. Estimates predict that the gap has grown from 10-15 years behind in the mid 
1950s to 20-30 years in the mid-1980s, and still growing (Glaziev and Motorygin, 1991, 
p.8). 
In their paper Economic Reform Impact on Soviet Research and Development, Glaziev and 
Motorygin emphasize that this situation compelled authorities to introduce Perestroika 
in the science establishment with the proclamation of a Government Decree on "The 
Transformation of Research Organizations on the Basis of Complete Self-Accounting and 
Self-Finance" by USSR President Gorbachev in the fall of 1987. According to this Decree, 
state research institutes receive some autonomy with respect to the formulation of 
research plans and the access to alternative sources of finance. The ministerial 
organizations and monopolies in the R&D sector were to be abolished and prices on R&D 
products liberalized. Simultaneously, the State Enterprise Law (SEL) and subsequent 
self-organization were advocated and implemented, the price setting mechanism for R&D 
products ceased to be the domain of the State, and limits to the size of personal income 
from R&D activities were abandoned. These elements facilitated the blossoming of a non- 
3 The rate of growth in the numbers of R&D personnel in the 1980s frequently dropped below 1% per year, 
whereas it ranged between 3-5% in the USA during the same period. The figures below indicate the much 
slower relative increase of R&D specialists in the USSR as compared to the USA throughout the 1980s 
(Gokhberg and Mindely, 1991, p.5). 
state R&D sector dominated by an unprecedented increase in R&D cooperatives that 
employed more than 320,000 persons and accounted for more than 3 billion rubles worth 
of work and services in 1989 (refer to Table 1). R&D activity seemed to become biased 
toward contract work to improve the quality. Such an emphasis will not rejuvenate the 
R&D sector as  explained in the discussion of the presentation below. 




Youth Research Centers 
Unfortunately, reality revealed that real shifts in the structure and quality of R&D 
activities failed to keep pace with the scale of the financial revolution. Conditions 
conducive to stimulating the demand for highly efficient and science-intensive production 
had not been created; one of the most critical being the absence of a well-defined 
intellectual property rights system, which inevitably impaired the ability to capitalize on 
R&D achievements. Many private f m s  began to resort to a type of industrial piracy that 
involved using and selling inventions and know-how developed by state organizations; the 
main form was the by-now legal, part-time employment of specialists fully employed by 
the state. Estimates show that more than half the scholars in the Soviet Union work in 
the non-state R&D sector, while many continue to be employed by the state (Glaziev and 
Motorygin, 1991, p. 15). Thus, these f m s  were no more than intermediate service agents 
that do not carry the burden of maintaining the equipment, infrastructure, and national 
obligations of a state research institute. Essentially, knowledge and technology was 
consequently transferred between research institutes and from these institutes to the 
production sector, but did not stimulate R&D activities. Whether revenue from the sale 
of these intellectual products is reinvested in R&D remains doubtful. In fact, numerous 
non-state R&D enterprises are consequently, indirectly subsidized by the state and may 
not be economically viable in a more competitive market without access to such resources. 
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The unavoidable weakening of central control over state enterprises (due t o  the 
implementation of the SEL) was accompanied by the decline of performance and 
enterprise promoted R&D. With the subsequent introduction of the new tax system, 
ministries lost the rights to collect any portion of state enterprise profits, cutting off an 
important source of industrial R&D funding. 
In the paper entitled Transformation of Basic Structures and Operating Mechanisms of 
Soviet Science, Piskunov and Saltykov cover most of the issues mentioned above and add 
a special account of the worsening situation throughout 1990 and early 1991. Industrial 
R&D was plagued by financial trouble due to the abolishment of the special industrial 
funds for science and technology development (distribution method of subsidies for R&D 
when regulation required all profits to be transferred to the state), the new 1991 tax 
system (including federal, republican, and local taxes on state enterprises' profits), the 
decreased profit leading to reduced demand for state R&D products by industrial and 
agricultural enterprises4, collapse of the state budget6, and the brain drain from the 
state research institutes t o  the emerging private sectol.6. In addition, more simple 
aspects such as the obsolescence of much experimental equipment and scientific 
instruments accompanied by the general deterioration of research premises are taking 
their toll on R&D advances. Finally, the opening of the Soviet economy has exposed 
previously protected areas of Soviet science and technology to levels attained in the 
international community, often revealing substantial gaps between the internationally 
publicized and the actual domestic research achievements. This is particularly true for 
the civilian sector. 
4 Already in 1988, the share of enterprises engaged in industrial R&D rose from 51.2% to 66.4% (Glaziev 
and Motorygin, 1991, p. 17). 
5~articularly in the case of basic research concentrated in the Academy and the Military Industrial Complex 
(MIC), which were largely dependent on state subsidies. In 1991, state budget revenues fell by as  much as 70 
% (partly accentuated by the War of Laws between the different levels of government). Expenditures on R&D 
in the MIC fell, in nominal terms, from 15.3 billion rubles in 1989 to 13.2 in 1990. With a 19% inflation rate 
in 1990, the real decrease is approximately 33 % (ibid, p. 11). 
613.5 % of R&D is carried out in the non-state sector. 
The Discu~sion:~ 
The presentations on the topic of R&D in the Soviet Economy revealed the enormity and 
complexity of the task to appropriately manage this factor that is a t  the core of the 
relationship between science and technological growth. Management of research and 
development in the USSR is characterized by a conflict between political, national, and 
historical priorities (competing at  all levels of science and technology), and countless 
distinct cultural and regional peculiarities. Although the economic transition has been 
recognized as necessity and reality, the existing influences appear to adhere to an excess 
devotion to maintain all institutions and employment in R&D, including the applied area. 
Different solutions are required in both the basic and applied areas. 
Two major factors differentiate Eastern and Western R&D systems. They are: 
1. The origin of basic research. A great portion is done in the special research 
institutes of the Academy of Sciences rather than in the higher education 
institutions. In this sense, the Soviet system resembles the French system 
most of those in the West. Generally, there are different mixes in the West, 
but determining the precise mixture for the USSR R&D community is, 
perhaps, not the most crucial issue at  present. 
2. The role of the enterprises. In the planned economic system, industrial 
R&D was not the responsibility of enterprises' management. If Perestroika 
proceeds and competition is established through demonopolization and 
privatization, the present system will prove to be infeasible and the number 
of free standing or independent industrial research laboratories will 
diminish because the industrial enterprises will themselves take up the 
research. Building a R&D laboratory into the enterprise allows the firm to 
work effectively and in a proprietary fashion with the laboratory to reduce 
the actual needs for formal legal instruments (as patents) in order for 
companies to best appropriate their returns. 
 he discussants i n  this session were Ben Martin, Richard Nelson, and Luc Soete (refer to the conference 
program in the Appendix for details). Additional comments were made by Otto Keck, Roger Levien, Richard 
Levin, and Merton J. Peck. 
The organization of science often reflects the organization of the economy. The 
differentiation and separation between fundamental and applied science is a crucial policy 
issue. This has direct implications for the distinction between basic and commercial R&D. 
The latter depends not only on the quality of R&D personnel. In a market economy, 
resources for applied R&D are allocated by the market mechanism in a decentralized 
manner responding to market forces. Resources for basic research are largely supplied 
by the government. Thus, a review of the experiences and literature on the integration 
of science and technology in a market economy would seem in order before considering 
policies that can propagate a simple division of R&D activities into non-profit 
(fundamental) and commercial (applied). 
Research and development, like the general situation in the USSR, is confronted with a 
lack of interactions by users a t  economic, societal, and regional levels. In analyzing Soviet 
R&D, three criticisms can be distinguished that have not been uncommon in the West. 
First, technological progress in the USSR has been characterized as proudly originating 
largely from its own roots. This influences the manner in which scientists and engineers 
solve problems, often far from economic reasoning, particularly in the short term, as it is 
unnecessary to start most investigations for new innovations or inventions from scratch 
in today's international scientific community. Second, science has habitually neglected 
the market influence of societal demands. Science and technology (S&T) appeared to be 
more imposed on society in the centrally planned economies (CPEs) than in the West. 
S&T were based much more on social integration in Western than in socialist society. It 
is considered by some to be a paradox that a capitalist based system has led to a better 
quality of life. Third, a major problem was the branch system or monopoly, which has 
been previously discussed in this paper. While management of S&T in the Soviet Union 
is rapidly becoming increasingly obsolete causing significant ineEciencies and 
unproductiveness in the economy, the advanced western industrialized countries are 
building new systems with technological growth potential. 
Soviet science and technology policy could have a more relevant and applied perspective 
for dealing with issues concerning the management of R&D if the following initiatives 
were undertaken: 
1. Conversion of the defense-oriented R&D to concentrate more on civilian 
issues. This is, a t  least to a some extent, beginning to happen. 
Additionally, there is a need for simultaneous commercialization and 
privatization of the state MIC that can make conversion effective. 
2. Directing a portion of the scientific effort towards specific areas that are 
less sensitive to short term price changes so that valuable resources and 
potential will not be lost. 
3. Closer interaction with other policy areas. Science does not operate in a 
vacuum, so it should not be isolated from but integrated in society and 
economy facilitating the liberation of creativity and the encouragement of 
exchanges and reviews. 
4. Closer ties with user needs. These make R&D effective. If R&D is linked 
to industry in a more competitive environment, it is consequently tied to 
user needs. 
5.  Actual integration of R&D into industry in order to  link it more closely to 
the production process and eliminate administrative and bureaucratic 
inefficiencies and barriers. This implies a need for the development of more 
in-house research. 
With regard to the time horizon of R&D activity, an increased devotion to short term 
projects causes the squeezing out of relevant long term research. Furthermore, the 
question concerning the portfolio of R&D has been a contentious issue in the West, and 
is now and will continue to be so in the Soviet Union. The rise of the independent 
industrial research laboratory owned by the firm in the West, was to separate some of the 
scientists and engineers from short term work. A typical example of the structure is a 
central laboratory (dealing with longer term issues) and decentralized laboratories that 
are closer to production, doing shorter term, demand oriented work. A final note related 
to timing, the R&D community in the USSR is struggling to accommodate economic 
reform and not the other way around. 
Numerous comments were made with respect to the statistics that were presented, their 
value, comparability and meaning. The information provided indicated the need for major 
restructuring in the field of R&D statistics. Before any policy decisions are made, it is 
crucial to have a clear and undistorted picture of the existing situation (i.e., R&D 
performance and potential). There is a need for modern and comparable statistics because 
the historical data collected are the product of the old institutional structure and were 
normally presented in isolation. The new Soviet style is to rely heavily on surveys, but 
whether these generate the best results, particularly because so much depends on who is 
filling in the questionnaires, is uncertain. 
As a result of traditionally inflated numbers coming from the Soviet Union, there is much 
interest in the precise definitions of the measures reported. For example, whether only 
full-time workers are included in R&D employment, who is actually classified as a 
scientist8, what exactly distinguishes a higher educational institution, what should or 
should not be included in material and technical resources and so forth. The meaning of 
certain indicators must also be clarified. For example, the age of equipment leads to 
questions of whether they were state-of-the-art when purchased, or an increase in 
graduate students may not have as positive an increase as first thought if, as in the US, 
there is a strong influx of foreign students (indicating that the number of domestic 
students may actually be decreasing while the total is increasing). Finally, the key will 
be a successful restructuring of R&D categories to best allow domestic analysis and 
international comparisons (possibly on a value basis). A first step may be to compare the 
definition of Soviet categories or indicators with those defined in the Frascati Manual and 
routinely used in OECD countries. 
Case Studies of Soviet R&D 
The Presentations: 
This session gave Soviet experts the opportunity to describe the research and development 
situation in a number of selected industries. These included chemistry, metallurgyg, and 
computerslO. A special case study on the development of regional scientific centers was 
B In the United States, while only 35 % of scientists are directly employed as R&D personnel, 45 % are 
employed in related activities. These make an essential contribution to research development and growth 
without being immediately associated with R&D. They are involved in marketing, communication, exchange 
programs, etc. 
g~rganizational Setup and Implementation of Applied R&D Projects in Metallurgy by A. A. Nikitin and V. 
G. Bobylyov. 
1 ?n two papers by L. Malkov entitled Survivability of the Soviet R&D Sector: Computer Industry Case 
Study and Eight Shifts in the Soviet Software Industry and the Future of the Computer Industry. 
also presented in the paper Perspectives on the Development of Regional Scientific Centers: 
The Town of Obninsk by Yurlov, Sorokin, SMyar and Gonnov. Most descriptions 
primarily alluded to the difficulties within the sectorsll, the obstacles to creative, free 
and market determined R&D, and the apprehension associated with domestic and 
international competition. The distribution between centralized and decentralized R&D 
was mentioned in light of the regional problems of technological progress. 
The Disc~ssion:'~ 
Western discussants questioned why and how the science and technology sector was able 
to grow so large in the presence of such formidable obstacles. Obviously, there were 
political and ideological goals at  the foundation, not those of the economy or the market. 
The recent decline of R&D financing must be seen as a process of weaning the R&D sector 
from state dependence. Market forces inevitably result in a dilemma; no success without 
failure. But the uncertainty incorporating the risks of failure and the benefits of success 
provide precisely the incentives required for competition. On the whole, Soviet state 
enterprises have not shown sufficient initiative. Thus, private entrepreneurs may do 
better in striving for survival. In the case of computers, i t  appears that a great market 
for specialized and tailored software exists in the USSR; while having the best technology 
will only be part of the success required to achieve market share, others are development, 
service, marketing, and so on. 
Science and technology is a mixed system in most western economies. The key is to move 
the research into an innovation quickly so that it can enter the market soon in order for 
the benefits of the product to be available. In the steel industry, for example, the 
producers themselves develop the research due to inter-industry competition (this is 
referred to as suicidal R&D, but if they do not do it, their competitor will). While the 
decrease in Soviet state funding has been accompanied by an increase in contract funding, 
'9hese included the absence of a clear system of property rights, apparent hostility to intellectualism, 
restrictions to professional advancement, poor communication (both physical and personal), profiteering and 
speculation, and so on. 
'?'he discussants in this session were Richard Levin, Franz Moser, Merton J. Peck and Thomas Richardson 
(refer to the conference program in the Appendix for details). Additional comments were made by Richard 
Nelson. 
the quantity of research contracted out in the West is kept to a minimum. The Western 
combination of in-house and external R&D is a perfect example of the mix of market and 
planned economics: internal R&D is more part of planning rather than market because 
the risk is high, there is uncertainty that often makes contracts unenforceable, and once 
much has been invested in a project there is a desire to preserve that continuity. Soviet 
policy-makers should proceed with caution when attempting to directly apply present 
western standards with respect to R&D management in any industry or sector because 
many are undergoing transitions in the West. I t  would be preferable to aim for longer 
term goals rather than short term advance that would only close in on a current level that 
may prove to be obsolete by the time it is attained. 
A short discussion on the prospects of transition for the regional scientific centers (also 
referred to as science towns) revealed similarities to company towns with one employer 
in a market economy. In North America, many of these towns have undergone 
transitions, successfully building up new opportunities, while others have become ghost 
towns with the inhabitants moving elsewhere to find employment. The market forces 
were the essence of their future. 
Technological Change in the Soviet Union 
The Presentations: 
The Soviet economy is characterized by profound structural and technological imbalances. 
Both the substantial discrepancy between administrative management methods 
(regulation) and the innovation processes, and the economic, ideological, and socio-cultural 
peculiarities have resulted in an economic and political system indifferent to innovation 
and technological change. Excess bureaucracy and ineffective state regulation have been 
identified as main obstacles to innovation. The five main factors cited as those most 
inhibiting innovative ability of the centrally planned system are state control and 
militarization, waste and shortage economy (including the so-called anti-innovation branch 
structure), monopoly and "monotonous organization"of innovations, economic culture, and 
technological incompatibility13. 
'?From the paper Responsiveness of Soviet Economy to Scientifi and Technical Innovations: Comparison 
with World Experience by Ageev and Kuzin, 1991. The authors also rather thoroughly cover the Western 
literature on technological change as  i t  pertains to the Soviet situation. 
The CPS signified total state control of economic life, including science and technology. 
Success was measured by the fulfillment of plan assignments and not by making scientific 
discoveries. The result has been a prevalence for short term interests (to meet the 
directives) rather than adaptive, long term commitments that could secure a more certain 
future. The long term orientation that has existed was one that remained inflexible and 
concentrated on old problems, thus becoming obsolete in the course of a modernizing 
world. In addition, investment, research, and technological policy was essentially 
dependent on the state budget. Any decisions with respect to these issues had to clear 
numerous hierarchial levels. Management of R&D financing and selection of particular 
paths of scientific and technological progress were, until recently, largely beyond the 
authority of the individual enterprise or association. On the whole, Soviet S&T progress 
has consistently had a substantial military/space orientation14. This was accompanied 
by a lack of devotion to economic development problems (including a disregard for creating 
national competitiveness), a severe neglect of the civil sector, and more direct 
consequences such as  monopsony situation, distorted prices, and secrecy. The 
militarization of R&D is a threat for the future of S&T progress in the Soviet Union due 
to the significantly weakened channels of converting advanced technology for use in 
civilian industry and the rigid command management of enterprises in the military- 
industrial complex (MIC). 
Paradoxically, the output orientation of the administrative system has, in the long run, 
led to a shortage economy. In the CPS, science and technological policy was restricted to 
the framework of the acceleration principle and had no real stabilizing role. This 
acceleration was sporadically initiated when central authorities became aware of a 
widening technological gap between the level in their country and those it was to be 
competing with. Of course, the huge shortages characteristic of the Soviet economy 
directly impeded S&T progress. Physical limitations impose on the scope of R&D, 
financial resources are scarce, and efforts to satisfy everyday needs divert crucial energy 
and creative potential. A product of such an economic system is the so-called anti- 
innovation branch structure. Its awkward and archaic character is primarily due to a lack 
of restructuring with respect to changing demands (particularly in the 1970s and 80s to 
become more R&D intensive), the inadequate development of various related services, and 
ld?n 1989, 15.3 billion rubles were spent on defense-oriented R&D in the USSR. This amounted to 71% of 
the state allocations for scientific activities. 
a high degree of obsolete capital stock15. 
The artificial type of Soviet monopoly based on administrative principles is clearly an 
obstacle to innovation and technological change. Insurmountable vertical economic 
barriers are a direct consequence of the departmental monopoly ("branchdom"). Soviet 
monopolistic management has led to degradation of product quality, lack of competition 
(especially to spur S&T progress), and a reduction of consumer choice. Both monopoly & 
monopsony features bias technological change and impede modern economic growth. 
Thus, there is little possibility for integration and inter-disciplinary activity. 
Nevertheless, ministries had the duty to maintain the given technological level of 
production according to predetermined state standards and to demonstrate technological 
achievements to the state authorities. In order to fulfill this purpose, the ministries had 
a pool that included not only plants and factories, but also research institutes, design 
bureaus, and laboratories, all somehow linked to industry. These are referred to as 
science/production agglomerations, which were ignorant to market impulses and processes 
due to their monopoly positions. Unfortunately, lobbying of the individual elements was 
strong, coordination between them was weak, and enterprises were generally quite 
unreceptive to innovations in any case. 
Certain features that normally motivate R&D and subsequent technological change and 
innovation in a market economy are not present in the economic structure of the Soviet 
Union. These include a functional capital market (as well as venture capital16), high 
labor mobility1', and international cooperation in research and exchange of scientists. 
The closed nature of the centrally planned system and the commitment to secrecy imposed 
extensive limitations on mobility of skilled personnel, and the transfer of information and 
technology. 
1 
'~stimates indicate that between 25% and 50% of the production machinery is obsolete and that annual 
repairs cost over 40 billion rubles in the engineering industry and employ tens of millions of workers (Ageev and 
Kuzin, 1991, p.9). 
1 
venture  capital is an important source of R&D financing, particularly for smaller enterprises or 
entrepreneurs, in market economies. High capital mobility, competition between financing sources, and a sound 
credit and financial system contribute to the opportunities for successful advances in science and development 
for parties that might be excluded from the conventional type of simple, traditional financial allocation of a 
command system. 
"~oviet personnel policies in the R&D field, which were based on hierarchy, secrecy and autocracy, caused 
problems with respect to the stimulation of creative work, the real active participation rate of skilled personnel, 
scientific and technological progress, and the democratization of the S&T sector. 
The prolonged domination of the CPS has resulted in the formation of a special Soviet 
economic culture. Among the major items influencing successful technological change was 
the aversion to competition and entrepreneurship, and the ignorance of the value of 
individual innovative spirit. Entrepreneurship was commensurate with exploitation, 
parasitism, and speculation. The use of ideological regulators of economic development 
and the existing planning and evaluation system of the results of scientific and 
technological activities led to an unprecedented "paper entrepreneurship" in the form of 
exaggeration of quality and quantity of results, and a trend toward spectacular projects 
with sensational results. 
Decades of command control, largely insensitive to changing demands, have resulted in 
incompatibility with technological standards of market economies, with the exception of 
few selected strategic areas. International R&D cooperation is vital for domestic 
technological progress and scientific competition that reflect the evolution of demand in 
a modern society. Reverse engineering was one of the few links that Soviet scientific and 
technical experts had to the international S&T community. This peculiar research 
method was particularly popular in the motor vehicle, aircraft, chemical, and micro- 
electronics industries. I t  was simply engaged in to organize production and not for the 
long term improvement or development of technology. Although there has been some 
trade in licenses, much of Soviet technology imports were merely of the turn-key style that 
limited further domestic development and expansion. The direct import of knowledge and 
exchange of established or aspiring scientists was minimal. 
In his presentation, Leonid Kosals comments that Soviet science continues to be plagued 
by the afflictions of the past (in his paper R&D Organization and Innovation in Industry 
in the Transition to Market). He adds that the current situation is progressively 
deteriorating due to the dismantling of all the traditional Soviet institutions and a sharp 
drop in the state demand for scientific products, which is then far too insufficiently 
compensated by the R&D demands from enterprises. 
In order to illuminate the problems regarding personnel, financing, organization, research 
quality, contacts with clients, and measures to reform the R&D sector, Kosals has 
surveyed a sample of leading scientific personnel (managerial level) from laboratories, 
departments, and institutes in three branch science and research institutes. Results 
indicated that 66% of the respondents identified the lack of financing (including sources 
of financing) as the main obstacle that scientific organizations face. While 62% want 
independent organizations with no superior body, only 22% hope to preserve the existing 
hierarchial style. More than half of the respondents see absolutely no advantages in 
having R&D institutes subordinate to ministries in the future. Although 64 % are in 
favor of converting the institute into a joint stock company, most admitted to a lack of 
knowledge and experience for performing such a change. Basically, the majority of the 
respondents are prepared to take the following four essential measures to reorganize their 
institutions to procure viability in a marketizing system: (1) independence from 
ministerial jurisdiction, (2) reform the ownership situation and intellectual property 
rights, (3) enhance performance, particularly by dismissing unproductive personnel, and 
(4) organize promotion and advertising for projects. This done, two-thirds of those polled 
are optimistically looking forward to the future, while only 18% expect a deterioration. 
Less than half are pessimistic about the development of demand for scientific products in 
the transition. 
Finally, the last presentation of the session expressed that the state strategy for S&T 
development has been aimed a t  achieving international leadership in certain spheres of 
human knowledge, often a t  the expense of economic efficiency (following the Mikerin and 
Kozlova paper: Technological Assessment Problems in the Transition to Market Economy). 
There was more emphasis on the support of large scale technological programs than on 
creating a favorable economic climate for innovations and technical change. The 
assessment of the effectiveness of new technology in the Soviet Union revealed 
contradictory results with respect to the contemporary global trends. The causes hereof 
were the distorted, expenditure-based central pricing system, central distribution of 
resources, artificially suppressed consumer prices, high state taxation of excess profits 
(practically negating reinvestment possibilities), low wages, and comparatively high prices 
for new technology. Consequently, i t  appears that the present and future cost of 
innovating is far higher than the potential return and an enterprise is better off to adhere 
to the traditional technology. On this premise, enterprises will never be motivated to 
engage in technologically progressive activities. 
The Discussi~n?~ 
The Soviet economy appears to be the most monopolized in the world of industrialized 
nations. Soviet innovation is a function of the bargaining process and is associated with 
rising inflation. In comparison, western innovation is identified with falling prices as a 
result of reduced costs brought about by the diffusion of the innovations. The following 
four factors are essential to successful innovation in the West: 
1. Industrial R&D is largely financed by firms and done in the industrial 
laboratories owned by firms. The R&D must be done in facilities that are 
directly responsible to management. 
2. A competitive approach to technological change. The presenters identified 
monopoly (the failure to have a competitive industrial structure) to have 
hindered innovation. Thus there is a need to restructure in order to 
encourage competition. A look at  the industries with great growth and 
clear technological progress in the West reveals that they have all been 
characterized by avid competition. A diversity of approaches to 
technological change developing simultaneously is an essential element that 
generates technological change in a market economy. Competition is 
required to provide incentives (i.e., the threat or risk of failing, not to 
mention the sweet taste of success). 
3. Scientists and engineers enjoy freedom to move. Mobility is essential for 
creativity. Communication is required in generating a proper structure 
conducive for innovation. Of course, too much mobility is deleterious for the 
firm's innovative activity due to proprietary reasons. 
4. University research plays an important role in industrial innovation in the 
West. The usual mechanism is people in industry identifying the needs 
that would be profitable and then reaching back to science for the answers. 
Thus, it is need and demand driven rather than science driven, though 
science facilitates finding the solutions. 
1 @The discussants in this session were Akira Goto, Otto Keck, Ben Martin and Richard Nelson. Refer to 
the conference program in the Appendix to identify which paper each discussant commented on. Additional 
comments were made by Richard Levin, Merton J. Peck, and Luc Soete. 
The Soviet Union cannot simply look toward contract research to solve the non-market 
problems of the S&T sector. There is a need for a move toward in-house research. The 
fact that Soviet R&D laboratories are, in a way, d i sco~ected  from manufacturing 
presents a real problem. A possible solution may be to divide them up by assignment and 
subsequently allow the market to direct the labor to those fields in demand. 
Some of the problems that plague the R&D community in the USSR are not unique and, 
therefore, should not be viewed so pessimistically. Inevitably due to the market 
environment that is a t  its basis, Western science does not have an  overall, coherent, 
concentrated, and organized unified quest for truth; rather, there is an  intense individual 
sense of competition. This competition may not be without costs. But the advantages of 
dissemination of scientific results are very great in the West, and thus it is actively 
inspired. In this light, the results of the Kosals survey, which showed R&D managers to 
favor decentralization, private ownership, mobility and other aspects of reform, are 
encouraging and display courage and ambition on their part. On these grounds, the 
outlook for Soviet S&T becomes more positive. 
The area of international technology transfer is important and will gain in importance as 
the process of transition to a market economy continues. The emphasis on the export of 
technology is understandable due to the need for hard currency, but a more appropriate 
policy orientation would have the emphasis on technology imports. This will bring the 
necessary results for long term modern economic growth if the surrounding environment 
is receptive. The current need for foreign currency should be secondary to the effort to 
build up internal welfare based on domestic economic growth. Some experts contend that 
the more technologies can be imported, the faster they will grow. Their technological 
balance of payments will be negative, but the trade balance could be running a large 
surplus (as in Japan, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and others). Other problems (i.e., 
hard currency) will be solved in the long run, but some strategic vision from the state on 
R&D imports can be helpful immediately (particularly where problems may arise with 
respect to the financial limitations of enterprises). 
Prospects for Restructuring the Institutions of Technological Change 
Presentations: 
The first two contributions of this session stressed not only the quality and potential of 
the military industrial complex (MIC) in the USSR, but also the urgent need for its 
conversion to  civilian uses before the resources may be lostlg. The MIC is the sector with 
the highest technological level because non-economic priorities such as the arms-race, 
desire for military supremacy, and others have led to a concentration of the most qualified 
personnel, state-of-the-art machinery and equipment, and enormous investments. This 
was done at the expense of the non-military industrp. Times have changed. Global 
disarmament and the pressure to restructure the domestic economy have forced decision- 
makers to actively undertake measures to begin conversion of the military industry to 
civilian uses. 
Conversion is a complicated process anywhere; more so, of course, in the Soviet Union 
where the defense sector was highly monopolized, isolated from the market, shrouded in 
secrecy, dependent on generous budget allocations and military orders, and had no 
independent marketing relations or functions. The transformation of the military 
orientation is particularly difficult in the case of large, specialized scientific organizations 
(with a large proportion of fundamental R&D established on an expensive and often 
unique experimental base), and closed zones or towns (where an entire geographic locality 
and its population has been devoted to the research, design, and production of specific 
military paraphernalia). 
Technological spin-off into the civilian sector has been negligible in the past. Aside from 
the military related grounds for this condition, additional, more practical reasons exist, 
such as no common system of coordination of new technology transfer, no financial or 
prestige rewards for transfer, insufficient return to enterprises making costs of 
implementation too high, and so on. A State Program for Defense Industry Conversion 
lg~efense  Research and Designing Institutes in the State's Program of Conuersion by Y. N .  Kulichkov and 
Technological Crisis and Conuersion of Military Industry by Y .  V .  Yakovets. 
2 0 ~ o t a l  state expenditures for R&D were 37.8 billion rubles in 1988. 75% of this was designated for use in 
the MIC (Yakovets, 1991, p. 2). 
until 1995 has been approved. The goal is to reorientate a substantial amount of R&D 
resources from the MIC towards civilian purposes. Almost 46% of the R&D resources of 
the defense sector should be implemented for civilian purposes by 1995, compared to only 
29.6% in 1989. 
At the outset of the reform process, certain legal support must be secured to encourage 
innovative activity and to provide an orderly market system with definite rewards for 
innovators21. Until recently R&D organization and financing was centrally planned and 
administered in command style. There was no room or desire for individual 
achievements, incentives for results, or unplanned creativity. Neither was there the 
potential of individual financial benefit from a discovery, nor was there any way of 
protecting it from free state distribution. The state was sole financier of R&D, thus also 
sole owner of scientific results. There have been no intellectual property rights, patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, or royalties comparable to those in market economies. Therefore, 
appropriate legal instruments and framework must be available to realize S&T growth 
during the transition to a market economy, and thereafter. 
Administrative management routine has suppressed the scientific community in the 
USSR. The key words associated with the transition to a market economy, such as 
decentralization, democratization, commercialization, privatization, competition and 
reorganization, indicate the need to eliminate or sweepingly restructure the institutional 
framework that has generously provided h d i n g  and stability for the R&D sector for 
decades, distancing it from the true requirements of a market oriented society. 
This is the essence of the paper by Glaziev, Prospects of Soviet R&D Restructuring, in 
which he emphasizes the need to change the whole paradigm of R&D organization, which 
was based on the fulfillment of state directives and non-market criteria for performance. 
His bold proposal for restructuring includes: integration of the processes of reorganization 
of research institutes and the privatization of state enterprises, dissolution of ministries 
and other administrative supervising bodies, restructuring of the state system of R&D 
finance and promotion, introduction of appropriate intellectual property rights legislation 
2 h i s  is the central topic of the  paper Legal Support of Innovation Activity by A. B .  Vengerov and A. A. 
Alexandrov. 
and state innovation policy, and reform of the education system. Sufficient demand for 
R&D products will be necessary for R&D restructuring to be successful and to make the 
sector viable throughout and after the transition to market conditions. Thus, 
demonopolization and the development of competition is a key prerequisite. There is some 
fear that privatization is presently taking place in the Soviet Union without 
demonopolization. The transformation of state enterprises into self-managed, joint stock 
companies can easily be followed by the rebirth of new organizational monopolies in the 
form of associations, conglomerates, and others. 
Research institutes cannot be privatized like enterprises. The appropriate form should 
depend on the character of research activity, whether basic, applied, developed, or any 
combination of the three. The reorganized institute may remain in the hands of the state, 
or be transformed into consortiums owned by firms, firms' R&D departments (i.e., 
previously scientific-production unions), small high-tech firms, centers for contract R&D 
(mainly only for applied R&D), self-managed organizations leased or owned by their 
employees, or transferred to universities or colleges. The transformation of research 
institutes must be accompanied by restructuring of the present R&D financing system. 
Although foundation or other private funding may be established, there will probably be 
a need to subsidize some R&D (particularly fundamental) during the transition in order 
to preserve accumulated R&D potential. The recipients for how much for how long must 
be carefully identified. 
The obstacles that hinder the realization of radical attempts to restructure include a 
shortage of resources (due to the distortion caused by fixed prices), lack of expertise and 
experience, inadequate structure of state bodies, and insufficient international exchange. 
A new national industrial policy is required to provide sufficient stimuli for enterprises 
with respect to long term investments, innovative activities, and foreign trade. Both price 
and quality competition should play an essential role in determining the route that 
research and development managers will take in the future. 
The Discu~sion?~ 
Conversion of the military industry is a common and widely discussed topic in Western 
industrialized economies. Countries like Japan or the USA have gone through quite 
extensive conversion programs in the pastz3. The conversion can come from above in the 
guise of a centrally planned conversion, or it can come from below when each enterprise 
seeks its own destiny. The latter, decentralized manner was typical of the USA. In 
Japan, conversion was sudden, but goals of the ensuing policies were to facilitate 
competition with an early emphasis on serving the world market with domestically 
developed products. Conversion from below is usually more successful because it produces 
products and technology that the civilian sector is demanding. The reorientation from the 
defense to the civilian sector has great potential due to the big backlog of demand for 
civilian products which has arisen during the decades of concentrating on military 
production. 
The Soviet Union has many assets that can be provided through conversion and the 
transition to a market economy. Many firms of the defense ministry are already 
producing a number of civilian products, primarily because no civilian firms engage in 
such production. Also, this great nation has a very well educated and highly trained 
population, particularly in the fundamentals. The West will need to provide assistance 
in certain areas such as education (exchange of students, scholars, managers, etc.) and 
technological agreements. Knowledge is more important than equipment (and much 
cheaper because it requires less foreign exchange) in the long run when the purpose is to 
build up domestic S&T potential. 
In developing the appropriate environment for progressive R&D the presentations referred 
to the construction of legal support for innovative activities. The law is to be a facilitator 
rather than a barrier for R&D. It is difficult to provide a complete legal structure for 
research, development, innovation, and diffusion. This structure must be adaptable and 
2!l?he discussants in this session were Alvin Klevorick, Roger Levien, Richard Levin and Merton J. Peck 
(refer to the conference program in the Appendix to identify the papers assigned to each discussant). Additional 
comments were made by Akira Goto, Ben Martin and Richard Nelson. 
2?n 1945, the USA had to undergo a much larger conversion than that facing the Soviet Union. At that 
time, approximately 40% of US GNP was devoted to defense. In Japan the large military sector, which was built 
up during WWII, disappeared overnight after the war. 
flexible as more is understood about the innovative process. Of course, providing model 
forms of contracts and legislation is valuable, but scope must be provided for adaptation 
and evolution of such documents. 
Preservation of the rights of individual scientists is very important. The individual 
inventor may not play a big role alone in developing innovations, but his role in an R&D 
enterprise is and will be crucial. There is a definite need for support for the intellectual 
labor market. There is no question that the concept of property rights must be clarified. 
Different industries use different methods in appropriating rewards from R&D such as 
secrecy, lead time, patents, and others. Market orientation gives enterprises alternative 
modes for appropriation and there may be a lesser role for the more formal methods (i.e., 
copyrights, patents, trademarks) as would be expected ex-ante. 
It is ironic to observe that in the transition of the Soviet Union to a market economy, it 
is Lenin's question that we face: What is to be done? The paper by Glaziev moves us a 
considerable distance in thinking about this question. 
As a consequence of the discussions, there seems to be agreement that basic, fundamental 
R&D will need support in the transition and thereafter. There is no economy which relies 
entirely on private funding in this area. It is the nature of basic research that it 
investigates not directly profit-making areas, in which firms (profit oriented in a market 
economy) tend to  underinvest. Applied research should be primarily funded by the private 
sector with the exception of private R&D that are aimed a t  or tailored to specific national 
preferences (i.e., defense), and in areas where goods are not really traded in the market 
(i.e., health, environment, ecology, and others)24. 
Funding becomes a key issue in the transition as there may be inadequate demand for 
applied R&D during this stage of development. The danger of insufficient private sector 
demand is the potential loss or destmction of valuable human capital (research teams, 
etc.) that may be very productive in the future Soviet economy. These may be the 
beneficiaries of some transition (temporary) subsidies. 
2 4 ~ h i s  is representative of the organization of R&D funding in most market economies. 
24 
A diversity of organizational forms is ultimately desirable. The same organizational form 
is not necessarily appropriate for all types of S&T activities. Many western experts are 
strong advocates of the view that the market should select appropriate organizational 
forms, but the market can only achieve such a solution with a decentralized style of 
laboratories and institutions with a variety of alternatives. Therefore, some science 
andlor industry might be quickly integrated into a new system, while others may stand 
alone for some time. Let it be re-emphasized that even if one believes that R&D done 
within the manufacturing enterprise will become the dominant organizational form, 
engaging the existing laboratories in contract R&D activities is likely to be a viable route 
during the transition if market forces are allowed to operate in full. It may prove to be 
tough for laboratories to be absorbed into f m s ,  because they may want to enter 
manufacturing directly. The latter is just another route the market provides. For market 
purposes, it is irrelevant whether the laboratories buy enterprises or vice versa. 
In returning to the problem of inadequate demand for R&D products during the 
transition, it appears that the applied field will face more difficulties than the basic area, 
though both will need some forms of support. It may prove to be unavoidable to continue 
a similar magnitude of (only) financial support from the state budget to basic science as 
was the case in the recent past. This must be accompanied by simultaneous, substantial 
changes with respect to establishing principles of competition for funding, competing 
sources, peer review, expert assessment for determining national priorities, and so on. 
Applied research presents a more formidable problem. Assistance will be required in the 
interim, but if too generous it can deter and defer the development of competition, 
innovation, and the benefits thereof. Transitional subsidies may make sense, but the new 
tax described in the Glaziev paper might accomplish the same results. The operation of 
the tax should be studied more closely to determine whether rules that govern the tax 
distort, in any way, the laborarories' or enterprises' choice of organizational structure. 
Experience has shown that it is preferable to avoid taxes that create an incentive to 
promote stand alone research laboratories or solely contract research. Any tax scheme 
is required to be neutral, while providing adequate funds for investment and development. 
Finally, there is a fundamental dependence of scientific and technological reform on legal 
and economic reform. In the legal sphere the central issue is the establishment of 
property rights of all forms (intellectual and material). The more quickly an appropriate 
legal framework is in place, the more rapidly the transitional problems will disappear. 
In the economic sphere, it is clear that for rational technological assessment at  the 
enterprise and national levels one needs the right prices (those that reflect the market 
determined supply and demand). Demonopolization is essential to allow competition to 
drive R&D investment. There are two separate benefits to demonopolization: (1) some 
competition will turn out to be better than no competition, and (2) in terms of increased 
size of total private resources invested in R&D, demonopolization and consequent 
competition will facilitate an improvement of the functioning of the selection process (the 
moving toward more desirable organizational forms). Labor mobility is of major 
importance in the economic sphere. S&T workers must be free to choose their employer 
and vice versa. To restrict labor mobility is to exclude a large fraction of the potential 
benefits of economic reform. 
Plans for Further Research 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and the USSR State Committee 
for Science and Technology agreed to continue their collaboration on the topic of Research 
and Development Management in the Transition to a Market Economy. Discussion 
concentrated on the most suitable approach for a productive, continuing activity. 
The suggested procedure would include a series of workshops (approximately one every 
six months), each focussing on one or two central topics. This would allow ample time for 
careful individual study. It also facilitates the maintenance of the core group of experts, 
but leaves sufficient flexibility to invite additional scholars and managers depending on 
the subject matter. The Soviet contributions would provide statistical and analytical 
information, while the Western experts would largely use these as a basis for policy 
oriented contributions. All research would be within the framework of a longer term 
project that will enable closer ties, further extension of an international network of 
scholars for each particular area, broadening existing collaboration, and flexibility to 
accommodate newly arising issues. Furthermore, IIASA would organize Advisory 
Committees to  assist in preparation. 
The potential topics of interest now include national science and technology policy, modes 
of organizing industrial research and development, transformation of military S&T 
capabilities to civilian purposes and activities, comparative analysis of intellectual 
property rights, restructuring of basic science research institutes, technology assessment, 
S&T indicators and statistics, and the importance of foreign technology and other 
assistance. Professor Levin and Dr. Glaziev, the co-leaders of the activities, are presently 
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Discussant: Professor Richard Nelson, Columbia University. 
Drs. L. Gokhberg and L. Mindely, Center for Soviet Science Statistics, Soviet R & D 
Resources: Basic Characteristics. 
Discussant: Dr. Ben Martin, Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University 
of Sussex. 
Session 2: July 13, 15:OO---19:OO 
CASE STUDIES OF SOVIET R & D 
Drs. Aizatulin and Kara-Murza, USSR Academy of Sciences Analytical Center, The State 
and Organization of Soviet Science: The Case of Chemistry. 
Discussant: Professor Franz Moser, Technical University, Graz. 
Drs. A.A. Nikitin and V.G. Bobylyov, Central Research Institute of Metallurgy, 
Organizational Setup and Implementation of Applied R & D Projects in Metallurgy. 
Discussant: Professor Merton J. Peck, Yale University. 
Dr. L. Malkov, CEMI, Survivability of the Soviet R & D Sector: Computer Industry Case 
Study, and Eight Shifts in the Soviet Software Industry and the Future of the Computer 
Industry. 
Discussant: Professor Richard Levin, Yale University. 
Drs. B.D. Yurlov, A.P. Sorokin, G.I. Sklyar, and I.V. Gomov, USSR Committee for Science 
and Technology, Perspectives on the Development of Regional Scientific Centers: The Town 
of Obninsk. 
Discussant: Dr. Thomas Richardson, Yale University. 
Session 3: July 14, 10:OO---14:OO 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION 
Drs. A. I. Ageev and D. V. Kuzin, Responsiveness of Soviet Economy to Scientific and 
Technical Innovations: Comparisons with World Experience. 
Discussant: Professor Richard Nelson, Columbia University. 
Dr. Kosals, Center for Research on Economic Transformations, R & D Organization and 
Innovation in Industry in the Transition to Market. 
Discussant: Dr. Ben Martin, Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University 
of Sussex. 
Drs. S. Kiselev and A. Voskoboy, USSR Committee on Science and Technology, 
International Transfer of Technology. 
Discussant: Professor Akira Goto, Hitotsubashi University. 
Drs. G. Mikerin and 0. Kozlova, Ministry of Industry, Russian Republic, Technological 
Assessment Problems in  the Transition to Market Economy, and 
Drs. Y. Petrov and A. Kiselev, Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering, 
Technological Niches and Economic Policy. 
Discussant: Dr. Otto Keck, European University Institute. 
Session 4: July 14, 15:OO---19:OO 
PROSPECTS FOR RESTRUCTURING THE INSTITUTIONS OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Professor Y.N. Kulichkov, Defense Research and Designing Institutes in 
the State's Program of Conversion. 
Discussant: Professor Merton J. Peck, Yale University. 
Dr. Y.V. Yakovets, National Economy Academy, Technological Crisis and Conversion of 
Military Industry. 
Discussant: Dr. Roger Levien, Xerox Corporation. 
Professor A.B. Vengerov and Dr. A.A. Alexandrov, USSR Committee on Science and 
Technology, Legal Support of Innovation Activity. 
Discussant: Professor Alvin Klevorick, Yale University. 
Dr. S. Glaziev, CEMI, Prospects of Soviet R & D Restructuring. 
Discussant: Professor Richard Levin, Yale University. 
Session 5: July 15, 10:OO--14:OO 
DISCUSSION OF PLANS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
R & D Management in the Transition to a Market Economy 
Moscow, July 16,1991 
Program on 
National Systems of Research and Development 
Professor Richard Nelson, Columbia University, 
National Systems of Technological Innovation: A Comparison (based on a 
forthcoming study of 15 nations). 
Dr. Luc Soete, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology, 
International Technological Competition and Cooperation (based on a recent report 
to the OECD). 
Professor Richard Levin, Yale University, 
R & D in the United States of America (with special reference to the problem of 
appropriability). 
Professor Akira Goto, .Uitotsubashi University, and Professor Merton J. Peck, Yale, 
R & D in Japan (with special reference to administrative guidance of the private 
sector and the importation of foreign technology). 
Dr. Ben Martin, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, 
R & D in the United Kingdom (with special reference to the organization of basic 
science). 
Dr. Otto Keck, European University Institute, 
R & D in Germany (with special reference to the mix of public and private sector 
activities). 
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